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ARE WE BECOMING A SOCIETY OF SUSPECTS?
VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J v. ACTON.
EXAMINING RANDOM, SUSPICIONLESS
DRUG TESTING OF PUBLIC
SCHOOL ATHLETES
I. INTRODUCTION
The influx of drugs into America's schools has forced educa-
tors to implement drug testing programs which were unnecessary
only a few years ago.' Many of these programs specifically target
student athletes as opposed to the entire school population.2 This
targeting of athletes has resulted in an increased number of chal-
lenges to school board imposed drug testing, thereby forcing the
courts to consider whether random, suspicionless drug testing of
public school athletes is constitutional.3
1. Mary L. Scott, Is Innocence Forever Gone? Drug Testing High School Athletes, 54
Mo. L. REV. 425, 425 (1989). According to the United States Department of Edu-
cation and the Department of Health and Human Services, schools are turning not
only toward educational programs to help combat the nation's drug problem but
also to drug testing. Id. A 1990 survey found that eight percent, or 1.6 million
youths between the ages of 12 and 17 reported using illicit drugs within the past
month and 24%, or 4.8 million, reported using alcohol. NAT'L INST. ON DRUG
ABUSE, NAT'L HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: HIGHLIGHTS 1990, 13, 14
(1991) [hereinafter HIGHLIGHTS], cited in Eugene C. Bjorklun, Ed.D., Drug Testing
High School Athletes and the Fourth Amendment, 83 EDUc. L. REP. 913, 913 (1993). For
young adults between the ages of 18 and 25, 15%, or 4.3 million, had used illicit
drugs and 63%, or 18.1 million, had used alcohol within the past month. HIGH-
LIGHTS, supra, at 16. Although data from the National Institute indicates a de-
crease in the use of illicit drugs and alcohol since the late 1970s, when drug use
peaked, other studies indicate that there has been no decline in usage. See, e.g.,
Jessica Portner, Study Showing Rise in Drug Use Called Into Question, XII EDUC. WEEK 8
(Oct. 28, 1992).
2. See, e.g., Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1324 (7th
Cir. 1988) (upholding random suspicionless drug testing of high school athletes);
Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 766 (S.D.
Tex. 1989) (invalidating drug testing of all students participating in extracurricu-
lar activities); O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 1007 (W.D.
Wash. 1988) (upholding University's student athlete drug testing program), revd
on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988); Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 669
(Cal. 1994) (upholding drug testing by NCAA); University of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863
P.2d 929, 949-50 (Colo. 1993) (invalidating random, suspicionless urinalysis drug
testing of athletes without voluntary consent), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1646 (1994);
cf Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709, 713
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (invalidating random testing of entire school
population).
3. Charles Feeney Knapp, Note, Drug Testing and the Student-Athlete: Meeting the
Constitutional Challenge, 76 IowA L. REv. 107, 109-10 (1990). Starting in 1987, the
federal courts began to consider the constitutionality of student athlete drug test-
(325)
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In cases where public school athletes are tested for drug use,
the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures are at issue. 4 Fourth Amendment protection extends
not only to conduct of police officers, but also protects students
from actions taken by public school officials.5 All government
searches, not just those conducted by law enforcement, are limited
by the Fourth Amendment.6 Traditionally, a Fourth Amendment
search would be deemed reasonable only upon the issuance of a
warrant based upon probable cause.7 The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant and prob-
ing. Id. at 109. For a discussion of cases on athletic drug testing, see supra note 2
and accompanying text.
4. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
A Fourth Amendment search is deemed unreasonable if it unjustifiably in-
trudes upon the privacy of an individual. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1968) (holding that Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable infringe-
ment of right to personal security); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361-62
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (recognizing that Fourth Amendment protects
against unreasonable invasion of privacy).
The Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of this amendment is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by gov-
ernmental officials. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (permit-
ting police officers to conduct suspicionless road block searches for registrations
and driver's licenses); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67
(1976) (holding that checkpoint stops are limited interruption to motorists while
vehicle is subjected to cursory visual inspection); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (allowing border stops when officer has reasonable suspi-
cion that car may contain illegal aliens); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-
97 (1975) (forbidding border patrol officers, in absence of consent or probable
cause, to search private vehicles at traffic checkpoints removed from border); Mc-
Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (holding that search without
warrant is not justified unless exigent situation makes search imperative).
5. See generally New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (holding that
Fourth Amendment restriction on unreasonable searches applies to searches con-
ducted by public school officials). Although students possess constitutional rights
when attending school, including the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures, courts have granted school officials greater discretion in searching
students than they have granted to police in searching adults or children outside
of the school setting. Id. at 340. For further discussion of T.L.O., see infra notes
65-72 and accompanying text.
6. Project, Seventeenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals 1980-87, 76 GEo. LJ. 521, 522-23 (1988) [hereinafter
Project].
7. Loree L. French, Note, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association
and the Fourth Amendment Warrant-Probable Cause Requirement: Special Needs Exception
Creating a Shakedown Inspection?, 40 CATH. U. L. Rv. 117, 123 (1990).
[Vol. III: p. 325
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able cause requirements in cases where "special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable . *.".."8 A search is reasonable
under this exception if the government's interests outweigh the pri-
vacy concerns of the individual.9 A compulsory drug test of an ath-
lete attending a public school is not a law enforcement search. This
search is subject to the special needs balancing of interest test.
When a public school requires its athletes to submit to a ran-
dom drug test, competing issues arise between the student's right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the school
district's desire to keep drugs out of its schools. 10 Vernonia School
District 47Jv. Acton, the topic of this Note, addressed these concerns
and found the random suspicionless drug testing of public school
athletes constitutional. 1 This Note will examine the various tests
created by the Supreme Court to determine the reasonableness of a
Fourth Amendment search. Additionally, this Note will discuss how
these tests are applied in the school setting. This Note will also
explore the holding of the Acton Court and analyze the decision in
light of previous caselaw. Finally, this Note will consider the reper-
cussions of Acton and how the Court's decision will affect future
drug testing of public school students.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1989, the school system in Vernonia, Oregon enacted a pol-
icy which randomly tested its student athletes for drug use. 12 This
8. French, supra note 7, at 138 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun,J.,
concurring)). In a school, therefore, requiring a warrant and probable cause
would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the educational environment.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
9. French, supra note 7, at 136.
10. Scott, supra note 1, at 425-26. Drug related programs raise concerns
about students' constitutional rights and cause students and schools to clash in the
courtroom. Id. at 425. See generally RIcHARD C. TURKINGTON, ET AL., PRIVACY:
CASES AND MATERIAIS, 104-14 (1992) (discussing development of reasonableness
tests used in non-law enforcement searches).
11. 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1364-65 (D. Or. 1992), rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir.
1994), vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
12. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1516 (9th Cir. 1994), va-
cated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). Vernonia, Oregon is a small logging
town of 3,000 people. Id. Between 1985 and 1989, teachers and administrators
began to notice an increase in disciplinary problems as well as a glorification of the
drug culture. Id. The students formed two groups, the "Big Elk," which was com-
posed mainly of athletes, and the "Drug Cartel." Id. Athletic coaches noted a
number of incidents involving students who had, or were suspected to have, used
drugs in the past. Id The coaches witnessed some of the problems, and were told
of others. Id. Some of these incidents included witnessing students smoking mari-
juana at a shop across from the high school, essays which described and glorified
1996]
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policy was initiated after parents, teachers and administrators per-
ceived a dramatic increase in drug use throughout the district's one
high school and three grade schools.13 School officials concluded
that the Vernonia drug culture centered around the schools' stu-
dent athletes. 14
After special classes, speakers, presentations designed to deter
drug use and a drug sniffing dog failed to decrease drug use in the
schools, district officials began considering a drug testing pro-
gram.1 5 The Student Athlete Drug Policy (Policy) was imple-
mented in 1989 "to prevent student athletes from using drugs, to
protect athletes' health and safety, and to provide drug users with
assistance programs."16 The Policy requires all students wishing to
participate in interscholastic athletics to sign a consent form au-
thorizing the district to perform a drug test on a urine sample pro-
vided by the student.' 7
The Policy also requires all athletes to be tested at the begin-
ning of each season and random sampling of athletes are tested
each week throughout the season.' The testing procedure differs
student alcohol and drug use, injuries to athletes performing basic maneuvers and
a hotel room smelling of marijuana at a wrestling meet. Id.
13. Id. Prior to 1985, only a small group of students used drugs and alcohol
and there were very few discipline problems in the schools. Id. The number of
disciplinary referrals in Vernonia schools between 1988 and 1989 more than
doubled those reported in the early 1980s. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2388 (1995).
The administration described the increase in the disciplinary problems as reaching
.epidemic proportions." Id. at 2389.
14. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2388-89. School sports are a major focus of the town's
life and student athletes are admired as role models in their schools and in the
community. Id. at 2388. More than half of the high school and elementary school
students participate in District sponsored athletics. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356.
Not only were athletes included among the suspected drug users, the District be-
lieved that they were the leaders of the drug culture. Id. at 1357.
15. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389. After receiving the blessing of the administra-
tion, a unanimous vote from the parents and the approval of the superintendent,
the Vernonia School Board unanimously adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy
in the Fall of 1989. Id.
16. Id, Student athlete drug use particularly concerned the District because
drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Id. In addition to its other
detriments, drug use affects the motivation, memory, judgment, reaction, coordi-
nation and performance of the student athlete. Id.
17. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1516. The testing requirement is applied to all students
wishing to participate in interscholastic activities. Id. It is limited to determining
whether the student has been using illegal drugs. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358.
18. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1516. During the season, the names of all students who
are participating in sports are placed in a "pool." Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358.
Nearly 10% of the names are drawn from the pool each week. Id. The students
whose names are drawn are tested one at a time throughout the day. Id.
4
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slightly for males and females. 19 A faculty monitor gives the student
a testing packet which includes a cup and a vial.20 The boys, accom-
panied by a male faculty monitor, go to the urinals in the boys
locker room.2 1 Each boy, fully clothed, produces a specimen in the
cup, while the monitor stands approximately twelve to fifteen feet
behind the student.22 The girls' samples are produced in an en-
closed bathroom stall, with the monitor standing outside. 23 Each
sample is then returned to the monitor, who checks it for tempera-
ture and obvious signs of tampering.2 4
The samples are transferred into the vial and sent to a private
company that specializes in urinalysis drug testing.25 The company
tests the samples for traces of amphetamines, cocaine and mari-
juana.26 Results are mailed directly to the district's superintendent
and are reported by telephone to authorized district personnel,
only after that person provides an authorization code to the com-
pany.27 If a test returns positive, a second test is administered as
soon as possible to confirm the results. 28 A student who returns two
positive tests is given two options.2 9 The student may either partici-
19. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358. Each student is required to complete a speci-
men control form which contains an assigned number. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
The student must identify prescription medication that he or she is taking by pro-
viding a copy of the prescription or a doctor's authorization. Id.
20. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1517. A monitor opens the packet and provides the stu-
dent with the cup. Actor, 796 F. Supp. at 1358.
21. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1517. Either Mr. Aultman, the school's principal or Mr.
Svenson, a coach, serve as the male faculty monitor. Id.
22. Id. At no time does the monitor have a view of the student's genitals. Id
The monitors testified that they generally listen for the normal sounds of urination
and do not always watch the student. Id.
23. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358. For the girls, a female school official acts as
the monitor. Id.
24. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1517.
25. Id. Security procedures have been designed to protect the chain of pos-
session. Id. The lab technicians are unaware of the identity of the student being
tested and rely solely on numbers assigned for identification purposes. Acton, 796
F. Supp. at 1358.
26. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1517. The testing procedure is 99.94% accurate. Id
Traces of other drugs may be tested for at the request of the District, but a particu-
lar student's identity does not determine which drugs will be tested. Acton, 115 S.
Ct. at 2389.
27. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389. Strict procedures are followed regarding the
chain of custody and access to test results. Id. Only certain District officials, the
superintendent, principals, vice-principals and the athletic Directors, have access
to the results, which are kept for a year or less. Id.
28. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1517. The student's parents are notified after the second
positive test. Id. If the second test returns negative, no further action is taken. Id.
29. Id. After two positive tests are returned, a hearing is conducted with the
student and the student's parents to determine the options available. Acton, 796 F.
Supp. at 1359.
1996]
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pate in a drug counseling program for six weeks or accept a suspen-
sion from the athletic program for the remainder of the current
season and the following athletic season.3 0 Following a second of-
fense, the student is suspended from participating in athletics for
the remainder of the current season and the next athletic season.3 1
For the third offense, the student is suspended for the remainder of
the current season plus the next two athletic seasons with no oppor-
tunity to reduce the penalty.3 2 If at any time a student refuses to
submit to a drug test, he or she is suspended from the team for the
remainder of the athletic season. 33
During the 1991-1992 football season, James Acton, a seventh
grade student, tried out for the Washington Grade School football
team. 34 At the first practice he was given a consent form for his
parents to sign which would allow the district to test James' urine
for drugs.35 James and his parents decided not to consent to this
procedure.3 6 Because he refused to submit to the drug tests, James
was suspended from interscholastic athletics. 3 7 There was no evi-
dence to suggest that James had ever used or was using drugs.3 8
James' parents subsequently brought an action claiming that the
drug testing policy violated James' right to be free from unreasona-
ble searches under both the United States and Oregon Constitu-
tions.39 The United States District Court for the District of Oregon
30. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1517. The student is retested before beginning the next
season for which he or she is eligible. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1359.
31. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1517. The principal of the school testified at trial that,
although not specified in the written policy, a student athlete who commits a sec-
ond offense may continue to participate in the athletic program if he or she sub-
mits to counseling and weekly urinalysis. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1359.
32. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1517.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1517. James and his parents scheduled a meeting with
Mr. Aultman, the principal of Washington Grade School. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at
1359. At the meeting, the Actons voiced their objection to the drug testing policy
because it required James to submit to a urinalysis in the absence of any evidence
that he had ever used drugs or alcohol. Id.
37. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1517. At the meeting between Mr. Aultman and the
Actons, Mr. Aultman told the Actons thatJames would be unable to participate in
District sponsored athletics unless he consented to the urinalysis. Acton, 796 F.
Supp. at 1359. Ellis Mason, the District superintendent, was informed of the Ac-
ton's decision and confirmed that James would not be allowed to participate. Id.
38. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1517. The policy was applied to James in the same way it
was applied to all other students who wished to participate in interscholastic athlet-
ics and was not based on any individualized suspicion thatJames had used drugs or
alcohol. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1359.
39. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1517.
[Vol. III: p. 325
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found the drug testing policy reasonable since the school's compel-
ling interest in protecting its students from drugs outweighed
James' privacy concerns.40 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, however, reversed and held that the Policy vio-
lated both the United States and Oregon Constitutions.4 1 Recog-
nizing the magnitude of this national problem, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari 42 and vacated the Ninth Circuit's
opinion, thereby affirming the district court's holding that random,
suspicionless drug testing of student athletes is constitutional under
the United States Constitution.
III. BACKGROUND
In Acton, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Vernonia
School District violated the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution by conducting urinalysis drug testing of student
athletes without suspicion of drug use. A discussion of the Fourth
Amendment is necessary to properly put the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Acton into context.
A. An Overview of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasona-
ble searches and seizures of their persons, houses, papers and pos-
sessions. 43 An important objective of the amendment is to protect
"expectations of privacy" - "the individual's legitimate expecta-
tions that in certain places and at certain times he has the 'right to
be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.' "44
40. Acto, 796 F. Supp at 1364. The court found the government's interest in
maintaining a healthy and productive scholastic atmosphere outweighed James'
privacy interest. Id. at 1368.
41. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1527. The Ninth Circuit held thatJames' legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in his excretory functions was not outweighed by any interests
asserted by the government. Id. at 1526-27.
42. 513 U.S. 571 (1994).
43. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, supra note 4 and accompanying text. The
Fourth Amendment only applies when a search is conducted by a government offi-
cial. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989). If
the search is undertaken by a private actor the Fourth Amendment and its protec-
tions do not apply. Id. at 614.
44. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985) (citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967) and quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis,J., dissenting)). See also, Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613-14; Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)
(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)); Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27
(1949)); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
1996]
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The initial inquiry in any Fourth Amendment analysis exam-
ines whether the activity being questioned constitutes a search. 45
Once a determination is made that a search has occurred within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the government must
show that the search was reasonable to survive constitutional scru-
tiny.46 There are several ways in which a Fourth Amendment
search may be reasonable. 47 Traditionally, a reasonable search re-
quired a warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause.48 How-
ever, over the years, the Supreme Court has upheld a number of
searches which were conducted without the prior procurement of a
warrant but with either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 49
These warrantless searches are considered valid if they fall within
one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the search warrant re-
quirement.50 Exceptions to the warrant requirement include:
45. See United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1429-30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 961 (1990) (identifying governmental action as "search" or "seizure" as
threshold issue). See also, Ellen M. Alderman, Dragnet Drug Testing in Public Schools
and the Fourth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 852, 855 (1986) (identifying activity as
search is threshold question).
46. Kathryn A. Buckner, Note, School Drug Tests: A Fourth Amendment Perspec-
tive, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 275, 279 (1987). A search is reasonable if it is supported
by a warrant and by probable cause under a traditional analysis or whether the
interests of the state outweigh the privacy interests of an individual under the bal-
ancing analysis. Id. at 279-80.
47. Stuart C. Berman, Note, Student Fourth Amendment Rights: Defining the Scope
of the T.L.O. School-Search Exception, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 1077, 1084 (1991). The con-
ventional interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is based on the premise that,
except for certain exceptions, a search is presumptively unreasonable if not based
upon a warrant issued upon probable cause. Id. at 1084-85. Under the less restric-
tive "general reasonableness" interpretation, the Court uses a balancing test to de-
termine the validity of a search. Id. at 1086.
48. Id. at 1085-86. A warrant is required to reduce the likelihood that law
enforcement officers or other governmental officials will arbitrarily invade an indi-
vidual's privacy. Buckner, supra note 46, at 280. A warrant may be obtained from
an impartial magistrate if a government official supplies specific information
describing who or what is to be searched. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a)-(c), 41(a)-(c). The
magistrate must determine whether probable cause exists to believe an offense was
committed, and whether the search or seizure is justified. Buckner, supra note 46,
at 280. Probable cause has been defined as "a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 238 (1983).
A search may still be unreasonable, however, even with the prior procurement
of a warrant based on probable cause. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11
(1985) (holding that despite probable cause to arrest, use of deadly force was un-
reasonable when officer correctly believed suspect to be unarmed); Winston v.
Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (noting that court compelled surgery may be unrea-
sonable even if likely to produce evidence of crime).
49. See infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text for a description of valid
warrantless searches.
50. Buckner, supra note 46, at 280.
[Vol. III: p. 325
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searches incident to a lawful arrest;51 searches where exigent cir-
cumstances such as "hot pursuit"52 or imminent destruction of evi-
dence exist;53 automobile searches; 54 searches where the evidence
is in plain view;55 searches based on the consent of the person be-
ing searched;56 stop and frisk searches;57 border searches; 58 inven-
tory searches; 59 and administrative searches. 60
In addition, the Court has approved some searches by balanc-
ing the extent of the intrusion on the individual's privacy against
the government's legitimate interest.61 When the governmental in-
terests are found to outweigh an individual's privacy interests, a
search conducted without a warrant may still be constitutional. 62
51. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (warrant not neces-
sary to perform blood test on suspected drunk driver during search incident to
driver's arrest).
52. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967) (evidence seized when of-
ficers entered house in pursuit of armed robber is admissible).
53. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1973) (police may take fingernail
scrapings from suspect without warrant to prevent destruction of evidence).
54. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) (police may search
car if individualized suspicion of wrongdoing exists, since warrant requirement is
impractical for easily mobile object).
55. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980) (seizure of property in plain
view is reasonable where there is probable cause to associate property with crimi-
nal activity).
56. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1982) (consent which is freely
and intelligently given will validate warrantless search); Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247-48 (1973) (holding that police officer may search arres-
tee and area within arrestee's control with individual's consent).
57. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (search is reasonable if officer has
reasonable suspicion that suspect was engaged in criminal activity and possibility
existed that person was "armed and presently dangerous").
58. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541-42 (1985) (rea-
sonable to seize suspected drug smuggler at border without probable cause);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (brief interrogative stop
at permanent border checkpoint is reasonable).
59. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (holding that police may
search personal effects of person under lawful arrest as part of routine administra-
tive procedure at police station).
60. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712 (1987) (warrantless administrative
searches of heavily regulated industries held valid); United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (administrative search exception extended to safety inspec-
tions of firearms dealers); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967)
(employing balancing test to assess validity of administrative search).
61. See Berman, supra note 47, at 1086-87. A search is unreasonable if it un-
justifiably intrudes on the privacy of an individual. Knapp, supra note 3, at 129-30
(citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390
(1989)). See also, Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (requiring that government's interest
justifying search must be balanced against intrusion on individual); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable interference of privacy).
62. French, supra note 7, at 126. When a search is conducted without a search
warrant, the court must determine whether the search is otherwise reasonable and
1996]
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Searches conducted without either a warrant or probable cause
have been held constitutional when "special needs, beyond the nor-
mal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable
cause requirement impracticable . ... ,"63 Therefore, some searches
are reasonable even in the absence of a warrant, individualized sus-
picion or probable cause.64
1. Development of the Special Needs Test
The special needs exception emerged in New Jersey v. T.L.O.6 5
In T.L.O., the Supreme Court addressed the Fourth Amendment
rights of students in the public school context.66 The T.L.O. Court
upheld the search of a high school student based upon a reason-
able suspicion that the student had violated school rules.67 A
school principal's warrantless search of a student's purse was char-
acterized as reasonable by the Court.68 By applying a balancing
whether the search falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Id.
63. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). The "special needs balancing of interest" standard involves a two-step
analysis:
(1) a showing that governmental interests presenting special needs be-
yond law enforcement justify departure from the warrant and probable
cause requirements, [and] (2) a weighing of the personal privacy interest
that is invaded by the search with the governmental interests that is fur-
thered to determine whether the search is reasonable.
TURKINGTON, supra note 10, at 115-16.
64. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989)
(holding that individualized suspicion is not required if government interest fur-
thered by search would be placed in jeopardy); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
654-55 (1979) (recognizing that some situations preclude requirement of individ-
ual suspicion).
65. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
66. Id. at 332-33. See also Berman, supra note 47, at 1077 (recognizing T.L. 0.
as first case implicating Fourth Amendment rights of students).
67. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. T.L.0. extended the administrative search war-
rant exception to searches of the property of schoolchildren. Id. The T.L.O.
Court approved using the reasonable suspicion standard as opposed to probable
cause. Id. at 340-41. The Court concluded that "the public interest is best served
by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable
cause." Id. at 341.
68. Id. at 327-28. A teacher at a New Jersey high school took T.L.O. to the
principal's office after discovering her and a friend smoking cigarettes in a school
lavatory in violation of a school rule. Id. at 328. After T.L.O. denied to the assis-
tant vice principal that she had been smoking, he requested to see her purse. Id.
The assistant vice principal inspected the purse and found cigarettes, rolling pa-
per, marijuana, a pipe, plastic bags, money and index cards with names of people
who owed T.L.O. money. Id.
The items found in T.L.O.'s purse were subsequently turned over to the po-
lice who brought criminal proceedings against T.L.O. Id. at 328-29. In juvenile
court, T.L.O. argued that the vice principal's search was illegal and moved to sup-
press both the evidence found in her purse and a confession made to the police,
10
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test, the Court disregarded the traditional Fourth Amendment re-
quirements of a warrant and probable cause.69 Under this judicially
created "special needs balancing of interest test," a school's need to
conduct a search is balanced against a student's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. 70 The Court recognized that if the Fourth Amend-
ment restrictions on unreasonable searches and seizures applied to
searches conducted by public school officials, these restrictions
must be lessened in order to preserve order and maintain an ade-
quate educational environment. 71 T.L.O. is significant because it
justified the suspension of traditional Fourth Amendment restric-
tions on governmental searches when the "special needs" of the
government make the probable cause and warrant requirements
impractical. 72
B. The Special Needs Test and Random Drug Testing
In 1989, the Supreme Court held, in two employment cases,
that the government's needs outweigh the privacy rights of individ-
which she claimed was tainted by the illegal search. Id. at 329. The juvenile court
denied all Fourth Amendment violations claimed by T.L.O. State ex rel. T.L.O.,
428 A.2d 1327, 1336 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1980). The appellate division af-
firmed the juvenile court's ruling. State ex rel. T.L.O., 448 A.2d 493, 493 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982). However, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed,
finding the search invalid under a reasonable suspicion standard (as opposed to
probable cause), the court further held that the reasonable suspicion standard
should govern school searches. State ex rel T.L.O., 463 A.2d 934, 942-43 (N.J.
1983). In addition, the court held that the evidence should be suppressed under
the exclusionary rule. Id. at 939. The United States Supreme Court reversed, up-
holding the search of T.L.O.'s purse. T.L.O, 469 U.S. at 332-33.
69. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41. The Court justified the balancing test by not-
ing that there have been other times when the warrant requirement has been sus-
pended because the "burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search." Id. at 340 (quoting Camara v. Munici-
pal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967)).
70. Id. at 337.
71. Id. at 334, 340. The Court's holding in T.L.O., however, seriously under-
mines the protection that the Fourth Amendment affords to all individuals, includ-
ing students. Buckner, supra note 46, at 293. The ruling apparently applies to any
search of a public school student since it did not mention any limitation to certain
types of school searches. Id.
72. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In T.L.O. Justice
White wrote for the majority:
The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school environ-
ment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child
suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would
unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal discipli-
nary procedures needed in the schools.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
The Court was careful to point out, however, that school officials cannot claim
that the students have no legitimate expectation of privacy. Id. at 338.
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uals and allowed for suspicionless drug testing in the workplace. 73
The Court revisited the special needs exception in Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Executives' Association.74 In Skinner, the Court addressed
the constitutionality of mandatory employee drug testing by an em-
ployer without the prior procurement of a warrant and without the
establishment of either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 75
The Court held that when "special needs" are implicated, a drug
test can be constitutional even in the absence of both probable
cause and individualized suspicion. 76
Based upon results of a Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
study of drug and alcohol use by railroad personnel, 77 the FRA
promulgated regulations requiring blood and urine tests to be con-
ducted on employees following certain major train accidents, im-
pact accidents or other incidents involving a fatality to an on-duty
railroad employee. 78 The Skinner Court initially determined that
the collection and subsequent analysis of the biological samples re-
quired or authorized by the regulations constituted a search of the
person subject to the Fourth Amendment.7 9 The Court acknowl-
73. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
74. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). Previously, the Supreme Court further developed
the special needs test in the following cases: Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
873-74 (1987) (holding parole officer's search of probationer's house was constitu-
tional because of government's "special need" in probation system); O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (holding search and seizure of papers in doctor's
office may have been constitutional because of hospital's "special need" in opera-
tion of psychiatric ward).
75. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-24.
76. Id. at 619-20. The Court recognized the government's interest in regulat-
ing railroad employees as a special need that justified departure from the warrant
and probable cause requirements. Id. at 620.
77. 50 Fed. Reg. 31,508-09, 31,514-25 (1985).
78. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609. The FRA found that from 1972-1983, "the na-
tion's railroads experienced at least 21 significant train accidents involving alcohol
or drug use as a probable cause or contributing factor" and that these accidents
"resulted in 25 fatalities, 61 non-fatal injuries, and property damage estimated at
$19 million (approximately $27 million in 1982 dollars)." Id. at 607 (quoting 48
Fed. Reg. 30,726 (1983)).
A "major train accident" was defined as any train accident that involves: (1) a
fatality; (2) the release of hazardous material accompanied by an evacuation or a
reportable injury; or (3) damage to railroad property of $500,000 or more. 49
C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(1) (1989). An "impact accident" was defined as a collision
that results in a reportable injury or damage to railroad property of $50,000 or
more. Id. § 219.201 (a) (2).
79. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17. The Court upheld its recognition that a com-
pelled intrusion into the body for blood to be tested for alcohol content and the
chemical analysis which follows to constitute a search. Id. at 616. See, e.g., Winston
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (holding court ordered surgery to remove bullet is
search); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (testing blood for
alcohol is search). Similarly, the breath test authorized by the railroad's regula-
[Vol. III: p. 325
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edged that collecting and testing urine constituted a search because
it "intrudes upon expectations of privacy [as to medical information
and the act of urination] that society has long recognized as
reasonable."80
In determining whether a suspicionless drug test is reasonable,
the Skinner Court recognized that the reasonableness test normally
requires balancing the governmental interest against the individ-
ual's privacy interests.81 Although the government's search in Skin-
ner lacked both a warrant and probable cause, the Court upheld the
drug and alcohol tests promulgated by the FRA as reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment since the government's compelling
safety interest outweighed the individual's privacy interest.82 In
making this determination, the Court applied the special needs ex-
tions was deemed a search, since the test requires the production of "deep lung"
breath and thereby implicated concerns about bodily integrity. Skinner, 489 U.S. at
616. See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 481 (1984). Finally, the Court
recognized that although the collection and testing of urine does not entail any
intrusion into the body, these acts are still searches because they intrude upon the
subject's expectations of privacy which society has long recognized as reasonable.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
80. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. The Fifth Circuit stated that:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the
passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk
about it at all. It is a function traditionally performed without public ob-
servation; indeed, its performance in public is generally prohibited by law
as well as social custom.
Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170. 175
(5th Cir. 1987)).
81. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654
(1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).
82. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 633-34. The Court stated that "where the privacy
interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important govern-
ment interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a require-
ment of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence
of such suspicion." Id. at 624.
In deciding Skinner, the Court looked for a compelling government interest
and not a legitimate interest that it found to be sufficient in its earlier checkpoint
case. Id. at 628. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562 (government interest must be
legitimate to justify search). The Court found the government to have a compel-
ling interest under these circumstances because of the risk of injury to others by
the employees subject to the tests. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628. By balancing the inter-
ests of the individual against those of the government, the Court held that the
drug testing satisfied a compelling government interest which did not unduly in-
fringe on the reasonable expectations of privacy of the employees. Id. at 633. The
majority emphasized that employees: (1) working for a heavily-regulated industry
and (2) involved in safety sensitive tasks have a diminished expectation of privacy,
therefore, the compelling government interest in safety outweighed the employ-
ees' privacy concerns. Id. at 634. The Court noted that random drug testing is
necessary to effectively deter drug abuse, especially given that establishing individ-
ualized suspicion is too difficult and, more often than not, untimely. Id. at 633.
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ception, thereby extending it to include the need for a safe railroad
transportation system.83
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,84 a case de-
cided the same day as Skinner, the Court went one step further by
upholding a urine testing program conducted without any evidence
of individualized or targeted class drug use.85 In Von Raab, the
United States Custom Service implemented a drug screening pro-
gram which required urinalysis tests on Custom Service employees
seeking transfers or promotions to positions either having a direct
involvement in drug interdiction, requiring the incumbent to carry
firearms or to handle "classified" material.86
The Court held that the public interest in the program must be
balanced against the individual's privacy concerns implicated by the
test to determine whether a warrant, probable cause or some level
of individualized suspicion is required in the particular context.8 7
The Court found that employees entrusted with the responsibilities
of drug interdiction and firearm possession have a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy due to the nature of their duties.88 In essence,
the Court held that a search is reasonable if there are valid public
83. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21.
84. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
85. In Skinner, the Court approved urine testing of a class of people, railroad
workers. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633. In Von Raab, however, the Court stated that:
The mere circumstance that all but a few of the employees tested are
entirely innocent of wrongdoing does not impugn the program's validity
.... The Service's program is designed to prevent the promotion of drug
users to sensitive positions as much as it is designed to detect employees
who use drugs. Where, as here, the possible harm against which the Gov-
ernment seeks to guard is substantial, the need to prevent its occurrence
furnishes an ample justification for reasonable searches calculated to ad-
vance the Government's goal.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674-75.
86. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-61. In Von Raab, there was no individualized
suspicion and no reason to believe that an appreciable number of the targeted
class of employees had used drugs. Id. at 673.
87. Id. at 665-66. The Court determined that, as in Skinner, the Custom Ser-
vice's goal of deterring drug use and preventing the promotion of drug users to
sensitive positions presented a special need that justified departure from the war-
rant and probable cause requirements. Id. at 666.
88. Id. at 672. The Von Raab Court said that employees who are involved with
drug interdiction should expect inquiries into their fitness and probity. Id. This is
true for employees who must carry firearms as well. Id. Since their jobs depend on
theirjudgment and dexterity, they cannot reasonably expect to keep from the Cus-
tom Service information that bears directly on their fitness. Id.
14
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interests that outweigh the interference with an individual's privacy
rights.89
Skinner and Von Raab promoted the use of a balancing test for
determining whether a drug testing program is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.9" The Court found that prior drug use or
suspicion of drug use of the individual or group to be tested is not
an essential prerequisite to the drug testing of urine. Even though
both Skinner and Von Raab involved drug testing in employment sit-
uations, their principles have been extended to encompass students
in the public school setting.91
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,92 the Supreme Court ap-
plied the special needs analysis of Skinner and Von Raab to the test-
ing of student athletes. The Court determined that drug testing
high school athletes without probable cause or individualized suspi-
cion was a reasonable search within the Fourth Amendment.93 By
examining the intrusion of the search into a student's privacy and
balancing this against the school's interest in safety for its students,
the Court concluded that random, suspicionless drug testing is per-
missible.94 The dissent argued that the District's Policy was too
broad and too imprecise to be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.95
89. Id. at 671. The Court agreed with the government's assertion that the
public should not bear the risk of employees who suffer from impaired perception
and judgment. Id. at 670-71.
90. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (discussing balanc-
ing test used in Fourth Amendment analysis).
91. See Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759
(S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that program for drug testing of students in grades
seven through twelve participating in any extra-curricular activity unconstitu-
tional), aff'd 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991).
Skinner established four propositions which apply to urine testing high school
athletes: (1) urine testing is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment; (2) a
search warrant is not required for urine testing; (3) probable cause is not required;
and (4) individualized suspicion of the person to be tested is not a necessary pre-
requisite to urine testing. Charles A. Palmer, Drugs vs. Privacy: The New Game in
Sports, 2 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 175, 184 (1992).
92. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
93. Id. at 2397.
94. Id. at 2396.
95. For a full discussion of the dissenting opinion, see infra notes 140-176 and
accompanying text.
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A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first provided a brief ex-
planation of the Fourth Amendment, including its requirements
and restrictions.96 The Court noted its previous recognition of
"special needs" existing in the public school context and proceeded
to base its decision on that precedent. 97 Ultimately, the Court de-
termined that a random suspicionless drug test conducted in a pub-
lic school setting was reasonable and hence constitutional for three
reasons. First, students have a low expectation of privacy in com-
munal locker rooms and restrooms.98 Second, the program was
designed to be as unobtrusive as possible. 99 Third, the Policy
96. Justice Scalia was joined in the majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer.
First, the Court established that the testing of urine required by the Policy is a
search subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J
v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2390 (1995) (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)). See also National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (recognizing urine testing as search). For a
full discussion of Skinner, see supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text; for a full
discussion of Von Raab, see supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
Second, the Court reiterated that once an activity is deemed a search, to be
constitutional, it must be reasonable. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390-91. Reasonableness
is measured by "balancing a [search's] intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests."
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
Generally, reasonableness requires the obtaining of a warrant with a showing of
probable cause. For a discussion of the history of the warrant and probable cause
requirements, see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. However, a warrant is
not required for all government searches to be reasonable and, therefore, prob-
able cause is not always required either. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390-91. A search
without probable cause may be constitutional when "special needs" make the war-
rant and probable cause requirement infeasible. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Black-
mun, J., concurring)).
97. NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985). In the public schools, the
warrant requirement "would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift
and informal disciplinary procedures [that are] needed," and "strict adherence to
the requirement that searches be based upon probable cause" would undercut
"the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain or-
der in the schools." Id. at 340-41. Justice Scalia noted that the search of T.L.O's
purse was based on individualized suspicion but acknowledged that " 'the Fourth
Amendment poses no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.'" Id. at 342 n.8
(quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976)).
Also, suspicionless searches have been upheld with respect to railroad person-
nel involved in train accidents, customs officers who carry arms or who are in-
volved in drug interdiction and automobile checkpoints seeking illegal
immigrants, contraband or drunk drivers. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633; Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 672; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562; and Michigan Dept. of State Police
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
98. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392-93.
99. Id. at 2393-94.
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served an important interest in combatting drug use in an effective
manner.100
1. The Nature of the Privacy Interest
Relying on TL.O., the Court recognized that the Fourth
Amendment only protects privacy interests that society recognizes
as legitimate.101 The Court explained that legitimacy varies with
the context of the search. 10 2 The Court emphasized that in this
case the subjects of the search are children who have been commit-
ted to the temporary custody of the state as schoolmaster and,
therefore, a privacy interest that might be considered legitimate out
of school might not be considered legitimate in school.103
The foundation of the Court's opinion was that unemanci-
pated minors lack some of the most fundamental of rights. 10 4 In
finding that children do not have the same rights as adults, the
Court quoted T.L.O., stating that "a proper educational environ-
ment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the en-
forcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly
permissible if undertaken by an adult."10 5 The Court concluded
that Fourth Amendment rights are different in public schools than
elsewhere, thus the inquiry into reasonableness must take this into
100. Id. at 2395-96.
101. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391 (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338).
102. Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337).
103. A legitimate expectation of privacy depends on the context in which it is
asserted. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337. For example, the definition of legitimate varies
if a person is in his home, at work, in a car or in a public place. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at
2391. Also, a person's privacy interest with respect to the state depends on the
legal relationship between that person and the state. Id See, e.g., Griffin v. Wiscon-
sin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-75 (198V) (recognizing that relationship between parolee
and state justifies parolee's diminished expectation of privacy).
104. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391. For example, the Court noted that minors lack
the right to self-determination, including the right to come and go at will. Id. In
addition, children are continually under the control of their parents or guardians
and once a child is placed in school, he or she is entrusted to the care of the
teachers and administrators of those schools. Id. A parent:
may .. .delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the
tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has
such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz.
that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the pur-
poses for which he is employed.
Id. (quoting 1 W. BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 441
(1769)).
105. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339). The Court
emphasized the fact that T.L.O. held that the nature of the student/teacher rela-
tionship is custodial and tutelary, allowing for a degree of supervision and control
over children that could not be exercised over free adults. Id.
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account.10 6 In reaching its decision that school children have a di-
minished expectation of privacy, the Court relied on the fact that
children are routinely required to submit to various physical exams
and vaccinations.10 7 These examinations, the Court reasoned, sup-
ported the proposition that "students within the school environ-
ment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the
population generally."10 8
Next, the Court emphasized that athletes, in particular, have a
diminished legitimate expectation of privacy. 109 The Court stated
that athletes shower and change for activities in a public school
locker room and, therefore, by choosing to play a sport, athletes
voluntarily subject themselves to higher regulation than that im-
posed on non-student athletes. 110 In this sense, the Court con-
cluded that student athletes are similar to adults working in closely
regulated industries. 1 '
106. Id. The Court noted that children do not "shed their constitutional
rights... at the schoolhouse gate" but the nature of a child's rights must take into
consideration what is appropriate for children in school. Id. (quoting Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). See also, Hazle-
wood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that public school
authorities may censor school publications in certain circumstances); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (holding that public school can
prohibit use of offensive and vulgar language in public discourse); Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975) (holding that right to due process for suspended stu-
dent includes only informal discussion about misconduct shortly after its
occurrence).
107. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392.
108. Id. (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348 (Powell,J., concurring)). According
to health officials, most public schools provide for vision, hearing, dental, dermato-
logical, as well as scoliosis checks at certain grade levels. COMMITrEE OF SCHOOL
HEALTH, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, SCHOOL HEALTH: A GUIDE FOR
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 2 (1987). Also, all 50 states require public school students
to be vaccinated against diphtheria, measles, rubella and polio. UNITED STATES
DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, CENTERS FOR Dis-
EASE CONTROL, STATE IMMUNIZATION REQUIREMENTS 1991-1992, p.1 .
109. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392. Justice Scalia noted that "[s]chool sports are
not for the bashful." Id. Students are required to change into athletic clothing
before practices or events and shower afterwards in a school locker room. Id. Jus-
tice Scalia described the locker rooms in Vernonia as "typical:" without individual
dressing rooms; unseparated shower heads lined up against a wall; and toilet stalls
without doors. Id. at 2393. Also, there is "an element of 'communal undress'
inherent in athletic participation." Id. at 2393 (quoting Schaill v. Tippecanoe
County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding random, suspi-
cionless drug testing of high school athletes)).
110. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393. For example, students who participate in inter-
scholastic athletics must submit to preseason physicals, acquire insurance coverage
or sign an insurance waiver, maintain a minimum grade point average and comply
with the rules established for each sport by the coach and athletic director of the
school. Id.
111. Id. Like these adults, student athletes have a reason to expect intrusions
upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy. Id. See Skinner v. Railway
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2. The Character of the Intrusion
Having discussed the narrow scope of the legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy of student athletes, the Court turned to the charac-
ter of the intrusion.11 2 According to the Court, the degree of
intrusion depends on how the testing authority obtained the sam-
ple.113 Under the District's Policy, where the male students pro-
duce samples at a urinal along a wall and females in an enclosed
stall, the privacy interests compromised by the process of obtaining
the urine samples are minimal. 1 4
In addition to the act of urination's infringement on a stu-
dent's privacy, urinalysis testing discloses information concerning
the state of the subject's body and the materials he or she has in-
gested.115 The Court, however, pointed out the significance that
the Policy tests only for the presence of drugs and not for other
health problems. 116 Important to the Court's decision was the fact
that the drugs the Policy tests for were limited, the results of the
tests were disclosed only to a small class of people and the results
were not turned over to law enforcement authorities. 117
Interestingly, the Court agreed that the Policy was intrusive be-
cause it required students to identify, in advance, any prescription
medication they were taking." 8 However, the Court ultimately re-
jected this argument, citing Skinner, because requiring advance dis-
closure of medical conditions is not per se unreasonable. 119 Further,
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989); United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
112. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393. Skinner recognized that urine testing intrudes
upon "an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy." Skinner, 489
U.S. at 626.
113. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
114. Id. The Court sees no distinction between this kind of testing and urinat-
ing in public restrooms. Id. For a full discussion of the Policy's testing procedure,
see supra notes 18-34 and accompanying text.
115. Id.
116. Id. For example, the results of the tests do not include whether a student
is epileptic, pregnant or diabetic. Id. See also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (recognizing
that chemical analysis of urine can reveal private facts about person being tested).
117. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393. The tests are not meant to be punitive in pur-
pose. Id. at 2393 n.2. Positive test results were not turned over to the police and
were not intended to present any future criminal consequences. Id. at 2393.
118. Id. at 2394. The Von Raab opinion had indicated that one of the features
considered in upholding the drug testing in that case was the fact that employees
were not required to disclose medical information unless they first tested positive
for drug use, and even then, the information was given to a physician, not the
employer. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672-73 n.2.
119. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394. The Skinner Court wrote that possibly having to
disclose medical information to a physician is not a significant invasion of privacy.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626 n.7. The fact that disclosure to teachers and coaches may
1996]
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by reading the plain language of the Policy, the Court concluded
that a student may choose to disclose the requested information in
a confidential manner, for example, in a sealed envelope to the
testing lab, thereby preserving the student's privacy. 120 Therefore,
according to the Court, as in Skinner, the invasion into a student's
privacy was insignificant. 12 1
3. The Nature and Immediacy of the Governmental Concern, and the
Efficacy for Meeting It
In this section of the opinion, the Court initially criticized the
Oregon District Court's and the Ninth Circuit's reliance on compel-
ling government interests justifying searches.' 22 Characterizing this
reliance as a mistake, the Court emphasized that "the phrase 'com-
pelling state interest,' in the Fourth Amendment context, [does
not] describe [ ] a fixed, quantum of governmental concern, so that
one can dispose of a case by answering in isolation the question: Is
there a compelling state interest here?"1 23 Rather, the Court noted
that the compelling state interest standard describes an interest im-
portant enough to justify the particular search, in light of other fac-
tors which show that the search intruded upon a genuine
expectation of privacy. 12 4 However, even though a relatively high
degree of governmental concern might not be necessary, the Court
concluded that even if it was, the School District met it in the pres-
ent case. 125
be construed as a greater invasion of privacy than to the government personnel
analyzing the tests in Skinner was not important enough to the Court to deem the
search too invasive. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.
120. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394. Even though the District took medical informa-
tion from the students at the time of the test, that practice was neither set forth in
nor required by the Policy. Id. The Policy said that "[s] tudent athletes who.., are
or have been taking prescription medication must provide verification (either by a
copy of the prescription or by doctor's authorization) prior to being tested." Id.
The Court interpreted this to mean that a student could provide medical informa-
tion directly to the lab. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2394-95. The compelling state interest found in Skinner was the
government's interest in preventing railroad accidents. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
In Von Raab, the interest was in insuring fitness of customs officials to interdict
drugs and handle firearms. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670. Based on these two cases,
the Oregon District Court and the Ninth Circuit both said that the District's pro-
gram of testing without individualized suspicion called for a compelling need. See
Acton v. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1363 (D. Or. 1992), 23 F.3d
1514, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
123. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.
124. Id. at 2394-95.
125. Id. at 2395.
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Again, comparing the facts of Acton to Skinner and Von Raab,
the Court held that deterring drug use by schoolchildren is at least
as important an interest as enhancing efficient enforcement of the
nation's laws against the importation of drugs or deterring drug use
among engineers and trainmen.12 6 More important to the Court
was that the necessity of deterring drug use is enhanced by the fact
that it concerns not just individuals at large, but children for whom
the State has undertaken a special responsibility of care and direc-
tion. 127 In addition, the Policy is directed towards drug use by ath-
letes, where there is an increased risk of harm to the athlete or to
others. 128
The Court, discussing the efficacy of the means used for ad-
dressing the problem, concluded that a drug problem fueled by the
"role model" effect of athletes' drug use would be best addressed by
making sure that athletes do not use drugs.129 Referring to the Ac-
tons' argument that less intrusive means were available to the Dis-
trict, namely testing only students who were suspected of drug use,
the Court responded that it has never mandated that only the least
intrusive search can be reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment.130 In addition, the Court found substantial difficulties with
testing based on suspicion of drug use. First, parents might not
126. Id. The effects of drug abuse are the most severe to school aged chil-
dren. Id. "Maturing nervous systems are more critically impaired by intoxicants
than mature ones are; childhood losses in learning are lifelong and profound
.."Richard A. Hawley, The Bumpy Road to Drug-Free Schools, 72 PHI DELTA KAPPAN
310, 314 (1990). In addition, the whole education process is disrupted when a
school becomes drug infested. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395. For a discussion of the
government interests found in Skinner and Von Raab, see supra notes 79, 81-85 and
accompanying text.
127. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395.
128. Id. The drugs tested for by the Policy impair judgment, reduce reaction
time, lessen the perception of pain and pose physical risks to the athlete. Id. The
Court accepted the District's findings that "a large segment of the student body,
particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion"
and that "disciplinary action had reached 'epidemic proportions.'" Id. (quoting
Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1357). For Justice O'Connor's criticisms of the District's
findings, see infra notes 150-153 and accompanying text. The Court characterized
the problem in Vernonia as an even bigger crisis of greater proportion than what
existed in Skinner and Von Raab. Id. Skinner upheld the testing without proof that a
problem even existed in the particular railroads whose employees were subject to
the test. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607. In Von Raab, there was no evidence of drug use
by any customs officials, yet the testing was found constitutional. Von Raab, 489
U.S. at 673, 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395-96.
130. Id. at 2396. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629 n.9 (citing Illinois v. Lafayette,
462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983)) (holding that reasonableness of search does not hinge
on existence of less intrusive means); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 556-57 n.12 (1975) (recognizing that less restrictive alternative arguments
could pose insurmountable barriers to all search and seizure power).
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accept drug testing of their children which is conducted in an accu-
satory manner.13 1 Second, teachers would be required to serve a
new function as spotters of drug abuse, a function for which they
are not trained.13 2 Finally, the Court concluded that testing based
on "suspicion" of drug use would be worse than the random, suspi-
cionless procedures required by the Policy.13 3
In conclusion, the Court found that the diminished expecta-
tion of privacy of student athletes, the relative unobtrusiveness of
the search and the severity of the problem helped by the search,
mandated a finding that the Policy is reasonable and, therefore,
constitutional.13 4 Reiterating the fact that this case involved the
government's responsibilities in a public school system as guardian
and tutor of children under its care, the Court limited its holding
by cautioning that suspicionless drug testing might not pass consti-
tutional muster in other contexts.13 5 The relevant question still is
whether a reasonable guardian and tutor would undertake such a
search. 136 Since the decision of the Ninth Circuit rested upon the
premise that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment and, therefore, unconstitutional under the Oregon
Constitution, the Court remanded the case to the court of appeals
in light of its decision. 3 7
131. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396. According to Justice Scalia, accusatory drug
testing creates a "badge of shame." Id. Also, testing by suspicion only, bears the
risk that teachers will arbitrarily test children who are troublesome but not neces-
sarily drug users. Id. According to the Court, this would increase the expense of
defending lawsuits. Id.
132. Id (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628) (recognizing that drug impaired indi-
viduals rarely display outward signs which are detectable by ordinary lay persons
and in many cases, not even by physicians).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396. Based on the findings of the District, the Court
concluded that this testing was one that a reasonable guardian would undertake.
Id. at 2397. The Court also pointed to the fact that no parents objected to the
testing of the students when a public meeting was held to discuss the issue. Id.
137. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 1297. On remand from the Supreme Court, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and held that the Oregon Supreme Court
would not offer greater protection under the Oregon Constitution. Acton v.
Vernonia School Dist. 47J, No. 92-35520, 1995 WL 546206, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 15,
1995). In dissent, Judge Reinhardt argued that this affirmation of the Supreme
Court's decision contradicted the court's previous declaration that "it is highly
likely that [the Oregon Constitution] will be found to offer more protection." Id.
(quoting Acton, 23 F.3d at 1518).
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B. The Concurrence
Justice Ginsburg, in a brief concurrence, reiterated that the
Policy only applies to students who voluntarily participate in inter-
scholastic athletics 1 38 According to Justice Ginsburg, the Court's
opinion reserved the question whether the District could constitu-
tionally impose drug testing on all students attending school.139
C. The Dissent
In dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and
Souter, criticized the majority's analysis of the Fourth Amendment
and its requirements. According to justice O'Connor, the majority
dispensed with the amendment's individualized suspicion require-
ment based on policy grounds.140 The dissent found that in mak-
ing its arguments, the majority sidestepped important
countervailing privacy concerns, such as blanket searches posing a
greater threat to liberty than individualized suspicion searches. 41
According to the dissent, even if the majority's policy arguments
were valid, the Court should not have based its decision on policy
grounds when suspicionless searches have generally been consid-
ered unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 42 In Vernonia,
it was not proven that a suspicion based regime would have been
138. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg
pointed to the recognition by the Court that the most severe punishment allowed
under the Policy is suspension from participation in extracurricular athletics. Id.
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). The results of the tests are not turned over to the au-
thorities and other than suspension from athletics, no further punishment is
sought. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358-59.
139. For a discussion of this broader question being reserved, see infra note
192 and accompanying text.
140. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). First, Justice
O'Connor disagreed with the majority's explanation that there was no concern
that school officials might act arbitrarily since every student athlete is being tested.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Second, the dissent denounced the majority for
finding that a broad based search regime diminishes the accusatory nature of the
search. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Blanket searches pose a greater threat to
liberty since they involve testing more people than searches based on individual-
ized suspicion. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing). Also, suspicion based searches provide potential targets with control over
whether they will be searched since a person can avoid the search by not acting in
a suspicious way. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Since the
ideal way to avoid acting suspiciously is to avoid the underlying wrongdoing, the
costs of individualized suspicion are minimal. Id. at 2397-98 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
142. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). According to Justice
O'Connor, a judge should decide, on policy grounds, which type of testing is bet-
ter or worse. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ineffective. 143 The dissent disapproved of making any exceptions to
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 4 4
The dissent criticized the majority's analysis because it ignored
the long standing history of the Fourth Amendment. 45 Relying on
the fact that blanket searches are traditionally "intolerable and un-
reasonable," the dissent indicated that even though the Policy
treated all athletes alike, evenhanded treatment is not a substitute
for individualized suspicion. 146 The dissent admitted, however, that
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted, individualized suspi-
cion was not required for all searches.' 47 However, those searches
that did not require individualized suspicion share two characteris-
tics: (1) they affected only one person at a time and (2) they could
have been avoided by refraining from wrongdoing. 48
Next, the dissent acknowledged that in the past the Court has
upheld several evenhanded searches, but only after balancing the
invasion of privacy against the government's interest.149 These
searches, which were held constitutional, however, could be distin-
143. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
144. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
145. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "For most of our
constitutional history, mass, suspicionless searches have been generally considered
per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Carroll v. United States, the
Court held that a warrantless car search was unreasonable unless supported by
some level of individualized suspicion. 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925). The Carroll
Court clearly indicated that evenhanded treatment was not a substitute for individ-
ualized suspicion. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Court said that "[il t would
be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop
every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons law-
fully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search." Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Therefore, the dissent concluded that the touchstone of the Fourth Amend-
ment is the protection of privacy, not evenhanded treatment. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at
2399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In criminal law, mass, suspicionless searches,
however evenhanded, are generally unreasonable if the search is more than mini-
mally intrusive. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990)
(upholding brief roadblock searches for intoxication); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.
85. 91-92 (1979) (invalidating evenhanded patdown searches of all patrons of tav-
ern even where there was probable cause to believe drug deal was going on). Ac-
cordingly, if evenhandedness was enough to justify a search regime, the warrant
clause, which presupposes that individualized suspicion is non-negotiable, would
be irrelevant. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2400 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For example,
searches conducted incident to an arrest did not require individualized suspicion.
Id.
148. Id, (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365
(1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
149. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2400 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
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guished because they (1) involved searches not of a personally in-
trusive nature 150 or (2) involved searches in unique contexts such
as prisons.15' Realizing that searches like those found constitu-
tional in Skinner and Von Raab cannot be explained by the grounds
stated above, the dissent distinguished those cases by pointing out
that the Court upheld the suspicionless search only after recogniz-
ing the Fourth Amendment's preference for suspicion based
searches and then demonstrating legitimate reasons why such a test-
ing standard would be unworkable under the circumstances.1 52
The dissent noted that the negative implication of the search ap-
proved by the Court in Skinner was that, if an individualized suspi-
cion requirement would not place the government's objective in
jeopardy, then the requirement should not be eliminated. 153 The
dissent also recognized that, in cases where searches were allowed
without the requirement of suspicion, testing based on suspicion
was impractical because not testing could yield serious conse-
quences for many people.154
According to the dissent, the environment in Vernonia stood
in marked contrast to those places where random searches are al-
lowed.155 Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's failure to dis-
cuss the historical and precedential facts which established that
individualized suspicion is "usually required" under the Fourth
Amendment and that, for intrusive personal searches, exceptions
150. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-703 (1987) (upholding
searches of closely regulated businesses).
151. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979) (upholding visual
body cavity searches of prisoners following contact visits).
152. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2401 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For example, the
Skinner Court recognized that "'some quantum of individualized suspicion'" is
"usually required" under the Fourth Amendment. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 (quot-
ing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560). This requirement was built into the Skinner
test, i.e. "[ijn limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the
search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by
the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized sus-
picion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion." Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Thus, in Skinner, an individualized suspicion require-
ment would have been impractical because of the chaotic scene following a railway
accident. Id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153. Actor, 115 S. Ct. at 2401 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 665-66.
154. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2402 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (recognizing that even one violation of
safety code could cause "fires and epidemics (that] ravage large urban areas");
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628 (recognizing that even one train wreck can lead to "great
human loss"); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670, 674, 677 (recognizing that even one cus-
toms official involved in drugs could result in breach of national security or in
delivery of "sizable drug shipmen [t]," which could injure thousands).
155. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2402 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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are made only when a suspicion-based scheme would be ineffec-
tive. 156 By not mentioning individualized suspicion, the majority es-
sentially ignored the requirement and its history in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. 157
The dissent disagreed with the Court's acceptance of the
School District's findings that concerns about a suspicion based
testing program were outweighed by concerns about the adversarial
nature of such a program. 158 For instance, the dissent noted that
there are safeguards against abuses of a suspicion based policy.159
Further, schools already conduct their disciplinary procedures in
an adversarial way. 160 The dissent rejected the District's concern
with a suspicion based policy and argued that the District did not
pay enough attention to the less intrusive nature of such a policy. 61
After explaining its disappointment with the District's findings, Jus-
tice O'Connor concluded that even if the District was correct, its
conclusions are irrelevant because the individualized suspicion re-
quirement is grounded in such strong historical and legal prece-
dent and should not be disturbed. 162
156. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the majority
never mentioned individualized suspicion regardless of whether a warrant and
probable cause are required. Id. (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
157. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "The Court treat[ed] a suspicion-based
regime as if it were any run-of-the-mill, less intrusive alternative - that is, an alter-
native that officials may bypass if the lesser intrusion, in their reasonable estima-
tion, is outweighed by policy concerns unrelated to practicability." Id. (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
158. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2402 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For the majority's
discussion of the District's findings, see supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
159. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2402 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Reasonable suspi-
cion would still be required in the school context for a drug test to be adminis-
tered and any discomfort from a false accusation could be minimized by keeping
the process confidential. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). With regard to reason-
able suspicion being necessary in the school context, Justice O'Connor noted that
the Court's previous decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O. would be controlling. Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-42. For a full discussion of
T.L.O., see supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
160. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2402-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Disciplinary rules
in the schools already require teachers and many administrators to investigate stu-
dent wrongdoing; to make determinations about whether any wrongdoing oc-
curred; and to impose punishment. Id. at 2402 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Adding suspicion based drug testing to these rules would be only minor according
to the dissent. Id. (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 2403 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). A suspicion based scheme would
be less intrusive because it would invade the privacy of only a few students rather
than many and would give potential search targets control over whether they will
be searched. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
162. Id. (O'Connor,J., dissenting). Individualized suspicion, can only be for-
saken when a suspicion based search would be ineffectual. Id. (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). According to the dissent, the record did not support these findings. Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Characterizing the majority as "misconstru[ing] the fundamen-
tal role of the individualized suspicion requirement in Fourth
Amendment analysis," the dissent criticized the majority for never
seriously analyzing the practicality of an individualized suspicion re-
quirement for Vernonia. 163 The dissent asserted that individualized
suspicion may only be forsaken when it is ineffectual, however, a
school is exactly the kind of place where individualized suspicion
would work. 64 For example, Justice O'Connor pointed to evidence
in the record that demonstrated that the students who were acting
suspiciously were readily identifiable and thus could have been
tested under a reasonable suspicion standard. 165 Having a suspi-
cion based testing scheme, therefore, might have solved Vernonia's
drug problem while preserving the Fourth Amendment rights of
students in the town.' 66
Recognizing the counter-argument that the Fourth Amend-
ment is more lenient with respect to school searches, Justice
O'Connor asserted that it is not so permissive that mostly innocent
students may be denied the Fourth Amendment's most basic pro-
tection against personally intrusive, blanket searches. 67 Next, the
dissent characterized the choice of cases relied upon by the major-
163. Id. (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
164. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In most schools, all of the potential peo-
ple to be searched are under the constant supervision of teachers, administrators
and coaches. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 ("[A]
proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren.").
165. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2403 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The evidence of a
drug problem consisted of stories of particular students acting in ways that gave
rise to a reasonable suspicion of drug use and would have justified a search under
T.L.O.. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-42. For example, there was testimony that small
groups of students were observed smoking marijuana at a restaurant across the
street from school during school hours, another group of students were caught
skipping school and using drugs at one of the student's houses, several students
admitted their drug use to school officials, one student was sent home by his
teacher for being drunk at school and another student was observed dancing and
singing at the top of her lungs during class. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2403 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
166. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2403-04 (O'Connor, J, dissenting). Justice O'Connor
noted that a suspicion based testing regime could have been supplemented by
having parents of the school children encourage their children to voluntarily sub-
mit to the drug testing program. Id. at 2404 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dis-
sent concluded that under the circumstances in Vernonia, a mass, suspicionless
search regime is categorically unreasonable. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
167. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor pointed to the Court's
explanation that schools have traditionally had special responsibilities with respect
to children and this necessitates a degree of constitutional discretion. See supra
notes 101-111 and accompanying text discussing the nature of the privacy interest.
Such discretion explained the search upheld in T.L.O. even though the same chil-
dren enjoy more protection in the non-school setting. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348
(Powell, J., concurring).
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ity as "ironic," since they affirmed that schools have considerable
discretion in responding to particularized wrongdoing. 168 In addi-
tion, the dissent disagreed with the majority's reliance on physical
examinations and vaccinations since they are not conducted to find
evidence of wrongdoing and are non-accusatory in nature. 169
In addition to the belief that suspicionless drug testing is unjus-
tified by the facts, the dissent found two additional Fourth Amend-
ment flaws in the Policy. First, no evidence was presented of a drug
problem at Washington Grade School, where James Acton attended
school when the suit was initially brought.1 70 Second, the school's
choice of student athletes as the individuals to subject to these tests
appears to have been grounded in the belief that such a policy was
the only kind of testing regime that would pass constitutional scru-
tiny.171 Although there was evidence of a drug problem in the high
school, there was minimal evidence presented that drug-related
sports injuries were a problem. 172 This anomaly reinforced Justice
168. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2405 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For example, in
T.L. 0., school officials were given discretion in investigating particularized wrong-
doing, in Ingraham v. Wright, school officials were given discretion in punishing
particularized wrongdoing and in Goss v. Lopez, school officials were given discre-
tion in choosing procedures by which particularized wrongdoing is punished.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676 (1977); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 570-71 (1975).
169. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2405 (O'Connor,J., dissenting). Physical exams and
vaccinations are like blanket searches. Id. (O'Connor,J., dissenting). The dissent
noted, however, that a suspicion requirement for searches of this sort would not
make sense. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In addition, the doctors performing
the exams are not searching for anything in particular. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing). Furthermore, a physical exam based on suspicion would not make sense
either because what those exams are testing for, i.e. heart conditions, do not ex-
hibit observable behavior like drug use. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Washington Grade School in-
cludes grades seven and eight, but the witnesses who testified at trial were high
school coaches and teachers. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
found no evidence of a drug problem at the grade school except for a declaration
by the principal that the drug problems experienced in Vernonia did not start at
the high school level. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The original program was designed to
search all students involved in any extracurricular activity. Id. (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). Justice O'Connor opined that the real reason behind the Policy was to
stop the rise of drug related disorder and disruption in the classrooms and not to
prevent injuries of athletes. Id. (O'Connor,J., dissenting). In addition, the princi-
pal of the school, Randall Aultman, has been quoted as saying that the reason the
requirement was restricted to athletes was because "we were afraid we'd be sued to
hell if we went to all students." Aaron Epstein, School Athlete Drug Tests Upheld,
PHILA. INQ., June 27, 1995, at Al. See also Nightline: Supreme Court Hears Student
Drug Test Case (ABC television broadcast, March 28, 1995) (transcript on file with
author) [hereinafter Nightline].
172. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In fact, the record
disclosed only one injury to a wrestler that could be attributed to drug use. Acton,
796 F. Supp. at 1357. Pressed at oral argument about the number of athletes in-
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O'Connor's argument that it would have been reasonable to focus
testing on the class of students found to have violated school rules
and who were also suspected of drug use. 173
In conclusion, the dissent noted that "the greatest threats to
our constitutional freedoms come in times of crisis."1 74 Therefore,
a judge's job is to make decisions based on the record alone. 75
Ultimately, Justice O'Connor found the District's Policy of suspi-
cionless testing of all student athletes swept too broadly and too
imprecisely to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' 76
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's determination that a drug test con-
ducted in a public school system without suspicion of any wrongdo-
ing is reasonable and thus constitutional ignored the long standing
history of the Fourth Amendment and the elements which are tra-
ditionally required for a search to be reasonable. In addition, the
Court's decision created a new Fourth Amendment standard, leav-
ing many important questions unanswered.
According to the Court, a child's legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy differs from that of the general population. 77 This proposi-
tion effectively demotes children to second class citizens. 178 More
specifically, the Court held that student athletes have an even lesser
expectation of privacy than their fellow students.' 79 Athletes were
jured during a school sponsored activity, Timothy Volpert, attorney for the school
board, could only point to this one incident. Transcript of Oral Argument,
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 1995 WL 353412, at *4 (U.S. Oral Arg., Mar. 28,
1995) [hereinafter Oral Arg.].
173. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). A suspicion based
Policy would test fewer students and give students the control as to whether they
are tested, i.e. by behaving properly. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 2407 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
175. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Sometimes, the governmental response
to a real crisis will serve as the compelling state interest, so to make sure the gov-
ernment is not overreacting to a crisis, it is important to base judgments on the
record before the Court. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
177. The Court stated that in determining the legitimacy of an expectation of
privacy, the fact that the searched parties are children who are under the tempo-
rary custody of the state must be considered. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391.
178. Rich Radford, Athletes Rights Are The Latest Casualty of War on Drugs, ViR-
GWNA-PILOT & LE-DGER-STAR, June 28, 1995, at CI (quoting Jerry Sheehan, legisla-
tive director of American Civil Liberties Union).
179. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392. The majority held that school sports are not for
the bashful since athletes must change and shower for their respective activities in
a public school locker room. Id. In addition, school athletes are susceptible to
more regulation since they voluntarily play a sport. Id. at 2393. However, in a
town like Vernonia, where entertainment opportunities are limited, athletics are
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chosen in Vernonia, in part, because that was the only way that the
school board's Policy would pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny.180
The majority also emphasized that because public school chil-
dren are required to submit to physical exams before entering
school, at least with regard to medical exams, students have a lower
expectation of privacy. 181 However, the school environment cannot
justify the Court's use of lowered Fourth Amendment requirements
in a balancing test involving students' interests in the integrity of
their bodies. 182 While the unique nature of schools may require
students to have a lower expectation of privacy in the items they
commonly display to their fellow students and teachers, this is not
so of their bodily functions. ' 83 According to Justice Scalia, one of
the reasons the Court upheld the Acton search was the minimal na-
ture of the intrusion. 184 This reasoning contradicts precedent
which clearly held that "[t]here are few activities in our society
very important to the community. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp.
1354, 1356 (D. Or. 1992). According to some commentators, student athletes are
no different than other students except for the fact that they play sports. Kevin B.
Blackistone, Drug-test Discrimination; Supreme Court Ruling to Allow Screening of High
School Athletes Not Fair, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 2, 1995, at C14.
180. Appearing on Nightline. Randall Aultman, the school's principal,justified
testing students who participated in extra-curricular activities on the basis that "[i] f
we had gone for the entire school population, I know that we'd have been in court
faster than two years." Nightline, supra note 171.
The generalization that athletes have a lower expectation of privacy supports a
warped view that this nation has on the importance of athletes. Radford, supra
note 178. Athletes were chosen in Vernonia because they were the most logical
guinea pig and the District could justify its Policy as an appropriate means of pro-
tecting the safety of athletes. Id. Athletes often get breaks, but drug testing is not
the price to be paid for special treatment. Id. Even at the high school level, ath-
letes are often placed on pedestals and are considered role models. Id. In some
cases, student athletes get privileges that other students do not, such as extra atten-
tion from teachers and guidance counselors. Id.
181. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392. The dissent was correct when it asserted that
subjecting public schools to the Fourth Amendment requirements in order to re-
quire students to undergo a physical before entering school would simply not
make sense. Id. at 2405 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The problem with this propo-
sition is that school exams are designed to make sure that students are in good
health and not to search for illegal activity. Id. at 2405 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
183. Acton, 23 F.3d 1514, 1525 (9th Cir. 1994). A student's interest in the
privacy of their urine is no less important because they are in school. Id. Courts
have held that "the Fourth Amendment applies with its fullest vigor against any
intrusion on the human body." Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d
470, 478 (5th Cir. 1982).
184. The Court admitted, however, that the Skinner decision held that urinal-
ysis testing invades "an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy."
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989).
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more personal or private than the passing of urine."18 5 The testing
of urine is not an insignificant privacy interest. A search of bodily
fluids is certainly more intrusive than the search of a purse, as up-
held in T.L. 0., where it was determined that reasonable suspicion is
necessary for such a search to be constitutional.18 6 Although Justice
Scalia authored the majority opinion in Acton, he dissented in Von
Raab, saying "I think it is obvious that [this search] is a type of
search particularly destructive of privacy and offensive to personal
dignity." 18 7
The dissent pointed out the importance of basing a decision
solely on the particular facts of the record and not reacting to the
demands of society, especially when dealing with a case that con-
fronts issues arising during times of crisis.1 88 The majority, how-
ever, consistently referred to the fact that the testing regime was
constitutional because it pertains to children, yet also reasoned that
privacy interests were supposedly lessened because only athletes
were being tested.18 9 When the Court talked about athletes, it es-
tablished that drug testing athletes is important because of the in-
creased risk of physical harm to the user and other players.1 90
Despite this reasoning, the testing lab did not test for steroid or
alcohol abuse, drugs which are common among athletes. 191
The Court's decision left many critical Fourth Amendment
questions unanswered through its failure to create any definitive
185. Id. at 617 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816
F.2d 170, 175 (1987).
186. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1989).
187. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's contradiction of himself is difficult
to justify given that adults surely have more freedom to choose where they work
than children have freedom to choose where they go to school.
188. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2407 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2392. See also supra note 111 and accompanying text.
190. It was established at oral argument before the Supreme Court that since
the program was implemented in 1989, only two or three tests have been positive.
Oral Arg., supra note 172 at *4-*5. This serves as proof that either the Policy was
very effective or that athletes were not the real problem in Vernonia at all. Id. at
*18.
One commentator has noted that the risk of harm to student athletes is not as
critical as the risk of harm in other professions. Blackistone, supra note 179, at
C14. "[Ilt isn't as if [athletes] are passenger airline pilots or have their fingers on
the red button. They are baseball players, wrestlers, high jumpers, gymnasts." Id.
191. The lab which tests the samples routinely tests for traces of amphet-
amines, cocaine and marijuana. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389. At oral argument,
Timothy Volpert surmised that alcohol was not tested for because alcohol is easily
detected on the breath and by its effect on behavior. Oral Arg., supra note 172, at
*19. Steroids, on the other hand, were not tested for because steroid testing is very
expensive. Id. at *20.
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standards or boundaries for school boards to follow. For example,
the decision failed to address the broader question of whether a
school district could subject all of its students to random drug test-
ing.192 Although Justice Scalia cautioned against extending this de-
cision, it could easily be interpreted to permit such suspicionless
testing of an entire student body.193
The Court's opinion answered the question left open in
T.L.O., concerning whether individualized suspicion is required
before a school official may search a student.194 By answering this
question in the negative, the Court has effectively ignored the
Fourth Amendment and its requirements, at least in the school
environment.
VI. IMPACT
Millions of American children attend public schools. The ma-
jority's decision to uphold random suspicionless drug tests has cre-
ated a gaping hole in the Fourth Amendment rights of students,
and, more specifically, student athletes. Because of the Court's de-
cision, millions of students who participate in interscholastic sports
may be required to submit to an intrusive bodily search. This
search will be required regardless of any indication of drug abuse.
While drug abuse in America's schools is clearly an enormously im-
portant topic and efforts to counter drug use through education
and intervention should and must continue, chipping away at the
foundation of the Constitution is an unacceptable way to solve this
problem. Every potential Michael Jordan, Steve Young or Chris
Evert, by the time they are twelve, will have to forfeit their privacy to
prove their innocence. 195
192. It was alluded to at oral argument by Mr. Volpert that under the facts in
Vernonia, the School District probably made a sufficient case for drug testing the
entire student body. Oral Arg., supra note 172, at *11. When this issue had been
previously tried however, it has failed. Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Re-
gional Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709, 713 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (invalidating
random testing of entire school population).
193. For a discussion of authors suggesting the broader implications of the
opinion, see infra notes 196-198 and accompanying text. Such broad interpreta-
tion of this opinion suggests that Justice Ginsburg's concurrence cautioning
against extension will not be followed. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
194. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8.
195. In fact, Wayne Acton, James' father, testified at trial that "[suspicionless
testing] sends a message to children who are trying to be responsible citizens ...
that they have to prove that they are innocent ... and I think that kind of sets a
bad tone for citizenship." Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2405 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting Trial Trans. at 9). In the American system of jurisprudence an accused
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It is unclear what the final impact of this decision will be, since
the Court's decision does not suggest any guidelines for school dis-
tricts. After the decision was handed down, for instance, specula-
tion that schools may use the ruling as a first step toward testing the
entire student body for drugs abounded.19 6 The decision left open
the broader question of whether a school district could subject all
of its students to random drug testing. 197 According to some, the
decision also gives permission to public colleges and universities to
test their athletes for drug use. 198 Moreover, in another school it
might be a different class of students, not athletes, who are sus-
pected of drug use - will drug testing this group be constitu-
tional?199 What about schools that cannot afford a policy that tests
all of the schools' athletes? Are they forced to choose only one or
two sports to test and, if so, which sports will be included or ex-
empted? What about non-contact sports such as golf, where the
risk of injury due to drug use is low if it exists at all? Also, can
performing drug tests be implemented as a preventative measure in
schools that do not have a drug problem?
Unfortunately, many questions were left unresolved by the
Court's decision, and it is uncertain how far a school board will be
allowed to go in trying to prevent drug abuse. By not imposing any
specific guidelines for school implemented drug testing and by
merely holding that a urine test is unintrusive and students have a
diminished expectation of privacy, the opinion suggests that all of
the above searches might be constitutional.
felon is innocent until proven guilty - apparently American school children do not
fall under this maxim.
196. Aaron Epstein, School Athlete Drug Tests Upheld, PHILA. INQ., June 27, 1995,
at Al (quoting Timothy Volpert saying that the Court's reasoning could support
testing the general school population); Paul M. Barrett, Court Says Schools Can Do
Random Drug Tests, WALL ST.J., June 27, 1995, at B1.
197. Epstein, supra note 196. According to the deputy general counsel for the
National School Board Association, drug testing could easily be extended to stu-
dents participating in extracurricular activities. Id. Further, the ruling would po-
tentially justify a high school program that grants parking spaces only to students
who consent to drug searches of their cars. Id. See also Linda Greenhouse, High
Court Upholds Drug Tests For Some Public School Athletes, N.Y. TMEs, June 27, 1995 at
Al. The types of behavior which the Acton decision could reach, beyond athletics,
are both unpredictable and frightening.
198. Barrett, supra note 196.
199. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon recognized
that in some large metropolitan high schools the students who engage in drug use
may not participate in or have contact with student athletes. Acton v. Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1365 n.8 (D. Or. 1992). A drug program at these
schools may not be constitutional. Id. at 1364-65.
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It is additionally unclear what kind of effect this testing regime
will have on deterring drug use. To avoid drug testing, a student
only has to avoid non-compulsory athletic activity. Will this policy
weed out abusers or make them think twice about playing sports?
There will always be some athlete who thinks he or she can beat the
system.200 A policy which requires individualized suspicion would
surely be more pragmatic in this regard. Furthermore, the Court's
decision was allegedly based upon concern for the safety of a
school's athletes since the consequences of drug abuse and threat
of injury were deemed more severe to them than for the general
school population. Following the Court's logic, if safety for chil-
dren is enough of an interest to justify drug testing, a more practi-
cal approach would allow a state to drug test all teenagers as they
get their driver's licenses. Statistically, more teenagers die or are
injured from automobile accidents than from getting hurt on the
playing field.201 Although the Court voiced its concern for athletes
as a special class of students, the Policy implemented in Vemonia
does not test for steroids which are drugs frequently used by ath-
letes, nor does it test for alcohol.
The war on drugs continues to be fought at the expense of our
nation's children. James Acton's only crime was wanting to play for
his seventh grade football team. Although the problem of drugs in
America's schools is very real, it is tragic that the Supreme Court
believes the problem has reached the point where it is necessary to
infringe upon the constitutional rights of all student athletes to de-
tect a few offenders. After this decision, it appears as though the
Court is moving even closer to universal drug testing of all citizens.
The essence of the Fourth Amendment used to be that the govern-
ment was forbidden from invading a citizen's privacy without a
clear basis to think he or she had done something wrong. The Ac-
ton decision, however, effectively teaches our nation's school chil-
200. Examples of players who think they can beat the system exist at the col-
lege and professional levels. One need look no further than University of Miami
football player Warren Sapp and baseball players Darryl Strawberry, Steve Howe
and Dwight Gooden. Radford, supra note 178.
201. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, no age
group has more accidents than the 26 million teen drivers in the United States.
Teresa M. McAleavy, Road to Freedom A Driver's License Comes With New Responsibilities
and Expense, THE REc., Oct. 3, 1995, at El. Statistics show that of every 1,000 teen
drivers, about 170 have accidents each year. Id. Teenagers, who make up about
seven percent of the population, make up 17% of the victims of fatal crashes. Id.
Although there are no statistics on deaths in organized sports, the American
Academy of Pediatrics reports that the number of fatalities in high school football
was four in 1985. Dick Kaukas, Children vs. Sports Injuries; Better Equipment Keeps
Risks In Minor League, COURIER-J., Mar. 26, 1995, at 1H.
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dren a frightening lesson: government officials can invade our
personal privacy without suspicion of wrongdoing.20 2 Now, instead
of free people, we are becoming "a society of suspects."203
Nancy D. Wagman
202. Tracey Maclin, Court is Off Base on Student Drug Tests, NEWSDAY, Aug. 9,
1995, at A32. Essentially, the opinion makes a mockery of prior declarations by the
Court that students "do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse
gate." Id.
203. Stephen Chapman, Schoolkids Caught in Crossfire of Nation's All-Out War on
Drugs, ORL. SENT., Apr. 2, 1995, at G3.
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